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Statutory Construction And The
Right To Vote
by Byron L. Warnken

In State v. Broadwater, 1 the Court of
Appeals of Maryland unanimously affirmed the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County, reinstating the right to
vote of a former Maryland state senator
who had been convicted of infamous
crimes. This was a case of first impression, interpreting the 1974 exception to
the rule oflifetime disenfranchisement.
Background
Tommie Broadwater, Jr., while a Maryland state senator from Prince George's
County, was convicted in 1983, in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, of four counts of food
stamp fraud 2 and one count of conspiracy to commit food stamp fraud. 3 He was
sentenced to three years, concurrent on
each count, with all but six months suspended, followed by four years probation and 1,000 hours of community seLVice. 4 Additionally, he was fined 520,000.00
and ordered to pay S18,420.00 in restitution.' As a result of his conviction, Broadwater's name was stricken from the registry of qualified voters in Prince George's
County.
While Broadwater was incarcerated,
the Maryland General Assembly and the
voters modified the Maryland
Constitution, requiring voter registration
as a condition of eligibility for seeking or
holding elective office. 6 After Broadwater
seLVed his prison term and while he was
on probation, he unsuccessfully challenged this constitutional amendment as
a violation of the equal protection clause
of the United States Constitution.'
Upon completion of his probationary
period, he attempted to register again as
a voter but was denied because of his
"conviction of disqualifying crimes."
Broadwater filed suit in the Circuit Court
for Prince George's County against the
Prince George's County Board of Super~The
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visors of Elections for denying him the
right to vote. The State of Maryland,
through the Office of the Attorney General, inteLVened on behalf of the Board. 8
At both the trial level and the appellate
level, Broadwater'S attack was based on
principles of statutory construction and
constitutional equal protection analysis.
The statutory construction argument was
whether one criminal proceeding in
which there is an adjudication of guilt
and sentencing thereon is only one "conviction" within the meaning of the election laws and thus Broadwater is eligible
to vote. The constitutional argument was
whether, assuming the statute were interpreted to deny Broadwater the right to
vote, the statute would violate equal
protection by restoring the right to vote
to rehabilitated first-timers who were convicted of one count in one trial, while imposing lifetime disenfranchisement on
rehabilitated first-timers who were convicted of multiple counts in one trial.
Circuit Court Judge Robert J. Woods
ruled that the statute is constitutional
and that Broadwater's interpretation ofit
is correct. The State and the Board appealed on the statutory construction issue; Broadwater cross-appealed on the
equal protection issue. The State filed a
petition for a writ of certiorari, asking the
Court of Appeals of Maryland to take the
case prior to consideration by the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland. The court
of appeals granted the State's petition
and sua sponte granted a cross-petition
for the equal protection issue on which
Broadwater had cross-appealed.' In its
affirmance of the circuit court, the court
of appeals adopted most, but not all, of
Br<;>adwater's seven statutory construction arguments. However, the court de-

clined to address the equal protection
argument. Judge Rodowsky stated:
At issue here is how § 3-4(c) applies
where there were guilty verdicts and
sentences on multiple counts charging infamous crimes in a single indictment against a person never previously convicted of an infamous
crime. . .. Based primarily on the
legislative history of the section and
on the social history immediately
surrounding its enactment, we hold
that Broadwater'S construction is
correct. 10
Statutory Construction
Broadwater's various statutory construction arguments all support the position that the legislature did not intend
the disparate result of reinfranchising rehabilitated first-timers convicted of one
count in one trial, while disenfranchising
for life rehabilitated first-timers convicted
of multiple counts in one trial. Argued affirmatively, the Maryland General Assembly, under the theory of rehabilitation of
ex-offenders, enacted article 33, section
3-4 (c), ending Maryland's rule oflifetime
disenfranchisement of convicted felons,
with the intent that first-timers, such as
Broadwater, are entitled to vote after
completing their period of incarceration
and parole.
From 1851 to 1972, under both the
Maryland Constitution and the Maryland
Annotated Code, persons convicted of
infamous crimes were disenfranchised
for life, unless pardoned by the GovernorY In 1972, the legislature enacted a
law, subject to voter approval, "providing for the repeal of the constitutional
prohibition of the right to vote for these
persons. "12 The statute proposed that the
voters delegate to the legislature the
decision "to regulate or prohibit the right
to vote of a person convicted of infamous

or other serious crimes ...."13 In 1974,
the General Assembly ameliorated the
lifetime disenfranchisement by restoring
the right to vote to any person if, "in connection with his first such conviction
only, he has completed any sentence imposed pursuantto that conviction .... "I~
The dispute in this case was simple.
The State asserted that each count or unit
of prosecution constitutes a "conviction"
within the meaning of section 3-4(c).
Accordingly, because Broadwater was
convicted of multiple counts in one trial,
he is beyond his "first such conviction"
and therefore ineligible to vote. Broadwater asserted that "conviction", under
section 3-4(c), means a criminal proceeding in which there is adjudication of guilt
and sentencing. Accordingly, because
there was only one criminal prosecution,
Le., he was tried, convicted, and sentenced only once, such adjudication was
his "first such conviction" and he is therefore eligible to vote.
The 1974 amendment changed the law
from one of total disenfranchisement to
one ofless-than-total disenfranchisement.
It provided some amelioration of the civil
disability of lifetime disenfranchisement
previously imposed upon the right to
vote. However, the legislature did not
totally eliminate the disability.
"[T]he search for legislative intent [is]
an effort to' ... discern some general purpose, aim, or policy reflected in the statute ... ,'''u Here, the legislative intent can
be gleaned from synthesizing the answers to two questions: (1) why did the
legislature ameliorate the harshness at
all, and (2) why didn't it completely ameliorate the disenfranchisement? The only
theory that explains some, yet not total,
restoration of the right to vote is rehabilitation. This is the only rational explanation for restoring the right to vote to
some persons while continuing to deny
forever the right to vote to others. Persons convicted of infamous crimes and
rehabilitated may vote; persons convicted
ofinfamous crimes and not rehabilitated
may not vote. The rehabilitation line is
drawn "in connection with his first such
conviction only. "16
Broadwater argued that the legislative
goal of rehabilitation can be discerned
from the national trend concerning the
restoration of voting rights at the time of
the 1974 amendment, from general principles of statutory construction, and by
analogy to the judicial interpretation of
similar statutory language.

The National Trend Toward Voting
Rights Restoration
When interpreting statutes, courts consider "the circumstances existing and
events occurring"17 when they were enacted, including the "cause or necessity
of making the Act .... "18 The statutory
1974 amelioration of the long-standing
rule of lifetime disenfranchisement was
no accident. It reflected the legislature's
understanding of, and agreement with,
the extensive trend at the beginning of
the 1970's to ameliorate the historical
harshness of disenfranchisement through
the enactment of laws restoring the right
to vote to rehabilitated ex-offenders who
had completed the sanctions resulting
from their convictions.

"The 1974
Amendment
changed the law
from one of total
disenfranchisement
to one of less-than
total
disenfranchisement. "
Disenfranchisement of certain ex-offenders, on theories such as punishment
and the purity of the ballot, has existed
for centuries. 19 Lifetime disenfranchisement demonstrates a rejection of, or at
least a failure to consider, rehabilitation.
The dilemma posed by these conflicting goals [of protection of society and rehabilitation of ex-offenders] is clearly reflected in existing
civil disability laws. In the apparent
interest of societal protection, legislatures have seen fit to place numerous restrictions on activities of convicted criminals . . . after release
from prison. Although these laws
were enacted in piecemeal fashion
over a period spanning two centuries and in many instances were
founded upon penal concepts that
have long since been discredited,
they continue to deprive former
convicts of many rights and privileges exercised by normal citizens. zo
Under the policy of disenfranchisement, "the protection of the public is
only tenuous. . . while the loss to the
offender is the opportunity to share in

government. [D]isenfranchisement can
find its analogue in ancient physical ostracism: instead of physically expelling
the individual, he is expelled from the
body politic."ZI
During the past twenty-five years, a
rapidly emerging theory of rehabilitation
has favored restoration of the right to
vote for ex-offenders. "If the criminal
justice system is intended to rehabilitate
criminals, it must treat them as full·fledged
citizens."22 Part of the impetus for this
trend came from four model acts espousing a rehabilitation approach to the disenfranchisement/restoration issue.
The model act of the National Probation and Parole Association provides for
restoration of the right to vote upon release from incarceration.Z3 The Model
Penal Code includes restoration of the
right to vote upon two years of nonrecidivism for persons who had been incarcerated and upon fulfillment of probation
and/or parole conditions. H Both the
model act of the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency25 and the Uniform Act on Status of Convicted Persons 26
provide for restoration of the right to
vote upon completion of probation, incarceration, and/or parole. Legal commentators also insisted upon reform:
[M]ethods for timely restoration of
all deprived rights and privileges to
reformed offenders are essential if
ex-convicts are to make satisfactory
readjustment in the community.
[T]he entire scheme of civil disabilities must be re-examined and
restrictions that are not necessary to
protect the public must be eliminated ....
[I]maginative measures are needed
to ensure that the disabilities imposed are removed as soon as the
convict's rehabilitative progress
indicates this action is warranted. 27
Another commentary included:
[D]isenfranchisement as a consequence of criminal conviction should
be abandoned in a society committed to individual rights and a just rehabilitative penal system.
Time and attitudes change. Criminal disenfranchisement may derive
from ancient and once venerated
doctrines, but its use today is an
anachronism ....
....The recent trend away from this
practice [ofdisenJranchisement] re20.1/1'he Law Forum-7

fleets an appreciation ofits deficiencies. Sociologically, it r:uns counter
to the rehabilitative goal of modern criminal justice. 28
By 1970, thirteen states had adopted
automatic restoration. 29 By 1973, twentyfive states had automatic restoration. 30
The extent and pace of this national trend
in the early 1970's is significant in light of
the pace inherent in the deliberative process oflegislative bodies. The speed of the
national shift is even more amazing because disenfranchisement is usually contained in the state constitution and not
merely in the code. 31
In 1972, the American Criminal law
Review conducted a survey on restoration of the right to vote, which was sent to
members of the Maryland legislature.32
The results indicated community-based
support in Maryland for liberalization of
the disenfranchisement law. 33 The Maryland General Assembly then proposed,
subject to voter approval, deletion of the
lifetime diserifranchisement provision
from the Constitution, with delegation of
the issue to the legislature. 34 In November 1972, 59.3% of the voters ratified the
constitutional amendment. 3'
Thus, in 1974, the legislature ended
Maryland's era oflifetime disenfranchisement. Adhering to the theory of rehabilitation, the legislature provided "one bite
of the apple" to persons convicted of
infamous crimes. Taking a position between the extremes oflifetime disenfranchisement and complete reenfranchisement, the legislature provided for restoration of the right to vote only for rehabilitated first-timers, based on completion of all sanctions imposed.
Even Richardson v. Ramlrez,36 the case
in which the Supreme Court upheld,
against an equal protection challenge, a
state's decision to disenfranchise all con-·
victed felons, recognized that the trend
was to disfavor such legislation. Chief
Justice (then Justice) Rehnquist stated:
"[T]he more modem view is that it is
essential to the process of rehabilitating
the ex-felon that he be returned to his
role in society as a fully participating
citizen when he has completed the service of his term ... [This view] is indeed the
more enlightened and sensible one ...."37
Conviction Means Criminal
Proceeding and Not Unit of Offense
In 1972, the Maryland General Assembly amended, with voter approval, the
Maryland Constitution, delegating to itself the decision to regulate or prohibit
8-The law Forum/20.1

the right to vote. 38 That legislation also
amended article 33, section 3-4, by adding a new subsection (c). Although subsection (c), as enacted, merely maintained
the status quo of disenfranchisement,
the provision, as originally introduced,
would have disenfranchised only persons "twice convicted."39 Even though
the word "twice" was deleted prior to
passage, the use of the term "twice convicted" is evidence that the legislature's
frame of reference was the number of
separate times convicted and not the
number of counts for which convicted.
In 1974, the legislature exercised the
power delegated to it and amended article 33, section 3-4(c).40 When introduced as Senate Bill 57, this legislation
would have taken Maryland from a position of no restoration of voting rights to
one of total restoration every time an
imposed sanction was completed. The
bill provided: "No person shall be registered as a qualified voter if he has been
convicted once of larceny or other infamous crime, unless he has been pardoned, or unless he has completed any
sentence imposed .... "41 Although the
bill was amended in committee, as with
the 1972 legislation, the number of times
convicted was the frame of reference.
Senate Bill 57 was enacted as follows:

"lAJ 'conviction' is
'that legal
proceeding which
ascertains the gUilt
of the party. ... "
(c) No person shall be registered as
a qualified voter if he has been convicted of larceny or other infamous
crime, unless he has been pardoned,
or, In connection with hlsfirst such
conviction only, he has completed
any sentence imposed pursuant to
that conviction, including any period of probation imposed by virtue
of parole or otherwise in lieu of a
sentence or part of a sentence. 42
Similarly, the preamble, as amended,
specified that the statute was "[fJor the
purpose of providing that a person may

be registered as a qualified voter ifhe had
been convicted of larceny or other infamous crime only once . ... "43
The only reasonable interpretation of
"in connection with his first such conviction only" derives not from the number
of counts charged, but from whether the
defendant is involved in his first criminal
proceeding resulting in adjudication of
guilt and sentencing. Regardless of the
number ofcounts, if it is the first time that
the defendant has been tried, convicted,
and sentenced, it is "in connection with
his first such conviction."
The Court of Appeals had previously
construed the meaning of the terms
"convicted" and "conviction" in the context of a civil disability statute. InMyers v.
State,44 the court addressed whether a
person who was found guilty of perjury
and given probation before judgment
was "convicted" of perjury and thus incompetent to testify.4' Without a statutory definition, the court stated that "the
meaning of 'convicted' and 'conviction'
turns upon the context and purpose with
which those terms are used. "46
"[A] 'conviction' is 'that legalproceedIng which ascertains the guilt of the party
... .'"47 "The meaning ofthe word 'convicted' . . . involves all the necessary
proceedings from the charge to the sentence inclusive."48 "The word 'punished'
... refers plainly to the penalty to be affIxed to the crime, but the word 'convicted' is much broader in meaning ....
[T]he word 'convicted' includes the accusation and the trial. "49
Broadwater argued, and the court
agreed, that the only relevant "context
and purpose" of "conviction" is whatever
the legislature intended when it specifIed
that a person otherwise disqualified
could, following completion of his sentence, vote "in connection with his fIrst
such conviction only." In using the statutorily undefIned word "conviction," the
legislature meant "criminal proceeding."
"Conviction" in article 33, section 3-4 (c) ,
refers to the process and not to the result.
The word "conviction", used as a measurement of the number of adjudicatory
proceedings and not as a measurement
ofthe number of counts, is better understood in the context of "only, " the first of
two qualifIers necessary for restoration
of the right to vote. That right, having
been lost as a result of conviction of
infamous crimes, can be restored only in
connection with the defendant's fIrst such
conviction. "Only" means "a single ... in-

stance or occurrence .'0 "Only" means "at
no other time. ..,1
The legislature's message is clear. It
would no longer bar from the voting
booth forever those persons convicted of
infamous crimes. However, it would
provide only one chance for rehabilitation and hence restoration of the right to
vote. The legislature did not provide this
opportunity only to those with "one
count"; instead, it provided this opportunity only one time-to "first-timers."
The second qualifier for voting rights
restoration is that the defendant must
have "completed any sentence imposed
pursuant to that conviction, including
any period of probation imposed by virtue of parole or otherwise in lieu of a
sentence or part of a sentence."'2 This
qualifier shows that restoration of the
right to vote is predicated on rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is predicated on
completing the outstanding obligation
to the State and is limited to "once."
If article 33, section 3-4 (c) , were interpreted as the State urged, rehabilitated
first-timers who were convicted of one
count in one trial could vote. However,
rehabilitated first-timers who were convicted of multiple counts in one trial
could not vote because they would automatically be beyond their "first such
conviction only." It seems inconceivable
that the legislature would enact a voting
restoration act for rehabilitated ex-offenders that automatically precludes from
its coverage a substantial percentage, if
not a majority, of those persons who othelWise would come within its scope.
"[W]hen a statute is plainly susceptible of
more than one meaning and thus contains an ambiguity the court may consider the consequences resulting from
one meaning rather than another and
adopt that construction which avoids an
illogical or unreasonable result, or one
which is inconsistent with common
sense.""
Judge Rodowsky stated the poSition of
the Court of Appeals as follows:
Thus, the legislative purpose of the
language relied upon by the State
concerns the timing or sequence of
convictions and not the interrelationship of charges in a multiple
count indictment. The "first such
conviction" does not refer to the
lowest numbered count charging
an infamous crime on which there is
a verdict or plea of guilty in an indictment charging multiple infamous crimes. "[F]irst such conviction" is used in the broader, layper-

son's sense of the occasion of conviction of a person who is a first time
offender, as opposed to a repeat offender. If a person who has never
previously been convicted ofan imfamous crime suffers a "first such conviction," the eligibility to re-register
as a voter arises when the first time
infamous crime offender has completed the entire sentence imposed
on all proven counts for all crimes of
all types on the occasion of that "first
such conviction.""

"Recidivist statutes
are enacted in an
effort to deter and
punish incorrigible
offenders. ... "
"Conviction" Versus "Violation"
In Montone v. State," the Court of
Appeals, adopting the majority view, held
that Maryland's habitual criminal statute
requires sequential convictions, meaning that the commission of one crime
"must follow the offender's conviction
for the preceding predicate crime. Under
the theory of these cases, two convictions
obtained on the same day may not each
serve as a predicate conviction because
the criminal has had no chance to reform between the first conviction and
the commission ofthe offense upon which
the second conviction is based.",6
The court in Montone found persuasive several opinions from other states.
"'Recidivist statutes are enacted in an effort to deter and punish incorrigible offenders .... They are intended to apply to
persistent violators who have not responded to the restraining influence of
conviction and punishment. ",7 "'It is the
commission of the second felony after
conviction for the first ... that is deemed
to make the defendant an incorrigible '".511
"[WJhen an individual has been convicted two times before being exposed to
the institutional rehabilitation efforts
afforded by a term ofimprisonment, the
two convictions shall count only as
one . ..."'9

In State v. Johnson,6O not quoted in
Montone, the court stated:

[I]f one accepts the more modem
view that our system of Criminal
justice is aimed equally at rehabilitating offenders, then it would not
be appropriate to sentence an accused as a second offender before
he had had an opportunity to amend
his ways after initial confrontation
with the courts of law.
[T]he great weight of authority in
the United States appears to support the latter view....
[T] he social demand for increased
penal sanctions would be directed
primarily at the recidivist and not at
an individual who had repeatedly
committed offenses condemned by
the statute but who had never been
brought to the bar of justice.61
Comparing statutes that require sequencing of convictions with those that
do not, the court of appeals recognized
in Montone that statutes that do not require sequencing are intended solely for
punishment, and statutes that require sequencing are intended, at least in part,
for rehabilitation. The court held that
Maryland's habitual criminal statute62 is
designed to identify persons incapable of
rehabilitation. The court stated that only
when the second conviction follows "an
intervening exposure to the correctional
system [can there be a determination of]
that individual's capacity for rehabilitation."63
In Garrett v. State,64 the court also
interpreted Maryland's habitual criminal
statute. Judge Wilner, addressing the legislative policy, stated:
"[T]he legislture in enacting such a
statute intended it to serve as a warning to first offenders and to afford
them an opportunity to reform, and
that the reason for the infliction of
severer punishment for a repetition
of offenses is not so much that defendant has sinned more than once
as that he is deemed incorrigible
when he persists in violations of the
law after conviction ofprevious infractions. 06'
By contrast to "conviction" under the
habitual criminal statute, Maryland permits probation before judgment upon a
first "violation" of driving while intoxicated or driving under the influence of
alcohol, but it prohibits such a favorable
dispoSition "for a second or subsequent
violation ... ".66 In State v. McGrath,6 7
the court addressed the "question [of]
whether ... 'violation' refers to the actual
20.1(The Law Forum-9

transgression ... or the subsequent adjudication of or conviction for the transgression .... "68 The court held that "violation" is different from "conviction" and
thus a person becomes, under the statute, a subsequent offender for a second
violation, even though he has not yet had
a first criminal proceeding or conviction.
Juxtaposing the two terms, the court
recognized that when the legislature uses
the term "violation," the defendant may
go beyond the "first" even though there
has been no criminal proceeding. On the
contrary, when the legislature uses the
term "conviction," the defendant cannot
go beyond the "first" until there has been
a criminal prosecution resulting in adjudication of guilt and sentencing, and
then, subsequent to conviction, there is
conduct that produces another conviction.
Also instructive is the analogy to the
concept of "reverse waiver" under the juvenile justice system. 69 "Reverse waiver"
permits transferring certain cases from
criminal court to juvenile court "ifa waiver
is believed to be in the interests of the
child or society. "70 The purpose is to treat
as juveniles, and not as criminals, those
persons who are amenable to juvenile rehabilitation.71 The statute prohibits a
"reverse waiver" to juvenile court of those
juveniles who have already had "one bite
of the apple." Subsection (b) provides:
"The court may not transfer a case to the
juvenile court under subsection (a) if:
(1) The child has previously been waived
to juvenile court and adjudicated delinquent; (2) The child was convicted in
another unrelated case excluded from
the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court .... "72 If the juvenile has been
through the system before, Le., been adjudicated delinquent or convicted, the
legislative determination is that the person be treated as an adult. The key is
whether the juvenile has learned from
the mistake and become rel\abilitated or
become a recidivist. The number ofcounts
in the previous proceeding is immaterial
to the legislative concern.
AddresSing the right of ex-offenders to
vote, the legislature did not consider the
number of counts relevant. Instead, it focused on the number of criminal proceedings. It was the intent of the legislature to restore the right to vote only to
those who were rehabilitated. A person
does not demonstrate a lack of rehabilitation by com.mitting a second violation
following a first violation. Rather, a per-

son demonstrates a lack of rehabilitation
by committing a second violation following a first conviction.
Louisiana offers the only previous judicial analysis of the statutory phrase "for
the first conviction only." In State v.
Wimberly,73 the defendant was found
guilty, in one criminal proceeding, of five
counts of drug distribution and two
counts of drug posseSSion, and the judge
imposed a suspended sentence. louisiana law provides that the judge may impose a suspended sentence "for the first
conviction oniy."74The State argued that,
because of the mUltiple counts, Wimberly was not being sentenced for his first
conviction only, and thus a suspended
sentence was in violation of the statute.
In an analysis that goes to the heart of the
issue in Broadwater, the Supreme Court
of Louisiana stated:

"[A] defendant is a

first offender until
he has proved
incorrigible after a
previous
conviction. "
Article 893 shares characteristics
and objectives with the multiple offender statute, and various repeated
offense statutes. The common legislative aim of such statutes is to serve
as a warning to first offenders, to
afford them an opportunity to reform .... Each statute is designed to
accomplish these objects, at least in
part, by limiting the judge's sentencing discretion after a first conviction
and by erecting a threat of enhanced
punishment for subsequent convictions ....
The general rule is that a defendant is a first offender until he has
proved incorrigible after a previous conviction. . . . [WJhether the
defendant bas demonstrated such
incorrigibility seems more relevant

than whether a defendant faces
more than a single charge in his
first prosecution. tbe latter eventuality may depend entirely on fortuitous circumstances or the prosecutor's discretion. 7'
Measuring "for the first conviction only"
from the other direction is People v. phi/lips,76 which interpreted the language
"convicted of a second or subsequent
offense." The court stated: "[A]n enhanced penalty should not be imposed
until the offender has had the opportunity to reform due to the salutary discipline of the punishment which he has
received as a consequence of his first
conviction. "77
Singular and Plural Include Each
Other
Although most rules of statutory construction evolved from the judiciary, a
few came from the legislature. One such
principle of interpretation was provided
by the Maryland General Assembly in
article 1, section 8, as follows: "The singular always includes the plural, and visa
versa, except when such construction
would be unreasonable."78
The statutory language at issue in
Broadwater was "in connection with his
first such conviction only. "79 Through the
use of article 1, section 8, the legislature
provided that article 33, section 3-4(c),
has the same meaning it would have if it
had been enacted as follows: "in connectiori with his first such conviction or
convictions only." This further demonstrates that "first" and "only" taken together mean one time - one criminal
proceeding. At that proceeding, so long
as it is the "first" such proceeding, it does
not matter whether the defendant faces
one count or more. Singular and plural
are interchangeable as to the word "conviction" because the legislature's concern was whether the defendant was
coming before the bar of justice for the
first time, and thus subject to rehabilitation under the statute, or whether the defendant was returning to the bar of justice unrehabilitated. In Su v. Weaver, 80
the court of appeals faced a similar issue
when interpreting the following provision of the Maryland Health Claims Arbitration Act:
Determinations-The arbitration
panel shall first determine the issue
of liability with respect to a claim
referred to it.... If the arbitration
panel determines that a health care
provider is liable to the Claimant or
claimants, it shall then consider,

I~TheLawForumV2~1---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

assess, and apportion appropriate
damages against one or more of the
health care providers that it has
found to be liable. 8!
In Su, the trial judge permitted the
claimant to introduce into evidence the
arbitration panel's determination as follows: "1. IlABIU1Y: Defendant is liable."
However, the judge denied the physician's attempt to introduce into evidence
the accompanying opinion, which contained specific findings as to each count.
The claimant contended that "issue" is
singular; the physician contended that
"issue" can be singular or plural, depending upon the number of counts and theories advanced by the claimant. The court
of appeals agreed with the physician, relying on article I, section 8.
The General Assembly's concern in enacting the legislation at issue in Su was
not the number of counts presented by
the claimant. Rather, the concern was to
have all claims presented at one stage,
followed by one apportionment of damages. This can only happen if the allegation, be it one count or many, is presented first, prior to an assessment of
damages. The frame of reference was the
first versus mult.ple adjudications because the policy underlying the compulsory arbitration system for malpractice
cases would be defeated if the claimants
were permitted multiple "bites of the
apple."
Similarly, the legislature's concern,
when enacting the voting rights restoration statute, was "first" versus "subsequent" adjudications. A "rehabilatation"
that would afford the ex-offender the
right to vote was offered only after the
first adjudiation. On the other hand, the
rehabilitative policy would be defeated if
the convict, having previously been convicted and sentenced, came before the
court as a recidivist yet was still entitled to
the benefits of rehabilitation.
Consistent with this analysis is the
opinion of former Attorney General
Burch, interpreting the then applicable
version of the statute that entitled a sher, iff to a $5 .00 fee "for service of a paper not
including an execution of attachment. "82
Applying article 1, section 8, the Attorney
General ruled that "paper" includes paper
or papers. 83 The legislature's concern
was for payment to the sheriff "for service". like the word "conviction" in section 3-4 (c), the word "service" is a term of
art lending itself to an argument that
each separate document is a separate

service under the statute. Nonetheless,
the Attorney General ruled that" [t ]he intent [is] compensation to the sheriff for
his efforts in effecting service, which are
the same whether the service involves
one paper or several papers."8~ It would
have allowed form to prevail over substance to permit the sheriff to abuse the
fee service schedule by counting each
paper within a stack as a new service
within the meaning of the statute. Similarly, it would have been form over substance, in light of the legislative goal, to
permit the State to abuse the right to vote
by treating each guilty count in one trial
as if it were separate trial.
Broadwater's position was that the legislature, in its use of the word "conviction", meant a criminal proceeding and
not an individual criminal count. However, even if conviction does mean count,
as a result of article 1, section 8, it means
count or counts. As the court stated in
Fogle v. State,85 "the term 'after former
felony conviction' does not necessarily
mean only one conviction. 'Conviction'
may mean in a general sense one or more
convictions."86

a

"the legislature, in
its use of the word
'conviction', meant
a criminal
proceeding. .. "
Remedial Legislation
Judge Rodowsky stated that"[ t ]he construction which we adopt is also consistent with the rule favoring liberal construction of remedial statutes. "87 The 1974
amendment presented the court with
classic remedial legislation. It was designed to do what no prior Maryland law
had done - restore the right to vote to
rehabilitated first-timers. In accord with
the modem, enlightened trend, the legislature intended to remedy the historical
wrong of imposing the same lifetime disenfranchisement upon both rehabilitated
and unrehabilitated ex-offenders. Statutes that are "remedial in nature, designed to correct existing law ... are to be
liberally construed in order to advance
the remedy.... "88
This particular remedial legislation was
also designed to eliminate a civil disability. Any ambiguity as to enfranchisement

versus disenfranchisment should be interpreted in favor of restoration of the
right to vote and against the civil disability of permanent disenfranchisement. The
court of appeals "has consistently and
repeatedly embraced [the] position" that
civil disability statutes should be interpreted in favor of "valuable rights and
privileges to be lost .... "89 One of the reasons for such an interpretation is the goal
of rehabilitating ex-offenders.
Other states construe ambiguities similarly. The Vermont disenfranchisement
statute provides: "[T]his chapter shall be
liberally construed, so that if there is any
reasonable doubt whether a [person
should be disenfranchised] the person
shall have the right to have the person's
name immediately returned to the checklist. "90 The West Virginia Attorney General stated:
[W]e should not deprive [the] right
to vote, except by clear words of disfranchisement. , .. He ought to have
a voice and representation under
principles offree government. True,
he has once offended, but he has
paid the penalty fIXed by the law of
his state. Reflect that the Constitution
is broad in its grant of suffrage ....
To exclude him the language must
be clear, ... It is wrong to debar of
a great privilege except where there
is no escape from it. 91
Laws governing the qualification and
registration of voters should be "construed liberally and favorably toward the
right to vote,"n The Supreme Court of
Oklahoma similarly stated: "[W]e think
(as the majority of courts appear to) that
when ... the imposition of a penalty as
serious as disenfranchisement is involved,
the strict legal definition of such terms
should be applied, "93 likewise, the Supreme Court of Georgia stated: "'Forfeitures are not favored, and courts incline
against them. When a statute may be construed so as to give a penalty, and also so
as to withhold the penalty, it will be given
the latter construction. "'9~
Moreover, civil disabilities, such as
disenfranchisement, have also been considered criminal or quasi-criminal
punishment.95 "The history of disability
statutes demonstates that these laws were
inspired in England as punitive measures
and were perpetuated by American legislatures without consideration oftheir rationale or effect."96 Statutes that are penal
in nature are strictly construed.97 Any ambiguity as to the punishment intended
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should be resolved, under the rule of
lenity, in favor of the person to be punished. lI8
Effect of House Bill 617
The State argued that the defeat, in
1978, of House Bill 617 supports its
position. The State argued that House
Bill 617 attempted unsuccessfully to accomplish what Broadwater claimed to be
the meaning of article 33, section 3-4 (c).
The State's position was that if the law
already meant what Broadwater claimed,
then there would have been nc need to
introduce House Bill 617. Broadwater
countered this argument on two grounds.
First, the court of appeals has recognized that the enactment of an amendment does not explain what the law meant
prior to the amendment. 99 A fortiori, nonenactment does not explain what the law
means. "[T]he fact that a bill on a specific
subject fails of passage in the General
Assembly is a rather weak reed upon
which to lean in ascertaining legislative
intent. "100 Moreover, the relevance of
legislative activity, whether resulting in
enactment or non-enactment, toward the
understanding of the intent of the legislature prior to such activity, is even more
dubious when there has been no judicial
gloss to make the legislature aware of any
statutory defect or ambiguity.lol Neither
the court of appeals nor the court of
special appeals had ever interpreted article 33, section 3-4 (c), prior to the Broadwater case. In addition, the court of
appeals has recognized that legislative attempts, both successful and unsuccessful, may merely seek to eliminate ambiguities in existing law. l02
Second, the defeat of House Bill 617 in
no way affected the Broadwater case. By
taking out of context the words "if simultaneously sentenced" from House Bill
617, the State argued that the bill would
have accomplished what Broadwater was
arguing. The State misunderstood the
two fundamental changes in the law that
House Bill 617 would have made, neither
of which addressed the meaning of the
statute before the court in Broadwater.
The disqualifying crimes in section 34(c) are "theft or other infamous crime."I03
"'Infamous crime' means any felony, treason, perjury, or any crime involving an
element ofdeceit, fraud or corruption."I04
House Bill 617 would have changed the
focus of the disqualification from the
type of crime involved to the size of
penalty imposed. An "infamous crime"
would have become "any crime (or com-

bination of crimes, if simultaneously sentenced) for which the total sentence
imposed, after deducting any suspension
or relief from sentence granted by the
court, is confinement in a correctional facility for more than one year or a fine of
52,500 or more, or both."IO'
Under section 3-4(c), disenfranchisement for first-timers lasts until completion of the sanction and for recidivists it
lasts forever. House Bill 617 would have
continued the lifetime disenfranchisement for recidivists and would have
changed the period of disqualification
for first-timers to the completion of the
sanction or one year, whichever is greater.

"The disqualifying
crimes, , , are 'theft
or other infamous
crimes', "

Thus, not only does nonenactment
provide no explanation of legislative intent, even if it did the nonenactment
would have had to have been of a bill substantially similar to the position argued
by Broadwater. House Bill 617 was too
dissimilar to have its defeat serve as any
message from the legislature as to its
intent in 1974 when it changed, through
Senate Bill 57, the law of lifetime disenfranchisement. The court of appeals, having already resolved the statutory construction issue, elected not to address the
State's argument surrounding the nonenactment of House Bill 617.
Equal Protection
Broadwater made one nonconstitutional and two constitutional arguments
related to equal protection, all of which
the court of appeals expressly declined to
address. The first argument was that statutes affecting the fundamental right to
vote should be construed broadly from
the standpoint of the right to vote and
strictly from the standpoint of limiting
the right to vote. 106
Broadwater argued that, even without
the court addressing the merits of his
equal protection arguments, the mere

existence of a nonfrivilous equal protection issue was sufficient for the court to
resolve the statutory construction issue
in his favor. In Davis v. State, 107 Judge
McAuliffe explained that the stronger the
merits of a constitutional challenge, the
more the need to interpret the statute in
favor of the challenger, thus avoiding the
constitutional dilemma. He stated:
As a matter of statutory construction, this Court has consistently
adhered to the principle that we
will, whenever reasonably poSSible,
construe and apply a statute to avoid
casting serious doubt upon its constitutionality. The interpretation
urged by the State generates serious
equal protection questions. There
may be no rational basis for the discrimination that would result from
the State's construction of [the statute].108
Broadwater argued that if the court
were to rule in favor of the State, such a
holding would cast grave doubts upon
the constitutionality of article 33, section
3-4 (c) , particularly in light ofthe "strict
scrutiny-compelling state interest-fundamental right to vote analysis."IOll When
there are two reasonable interpretations,
the court should adopt the interpretation that permits it to avoid even reaching
the constitutional issue. llo
Broadwater's second equal protection
argument was that, because the right to
vote is a fundamental constitutional right,
if article 33, section 3-4(c), were to restore the right to vote to rehabilitated
first-timers who were convicted of one
count in one trial, but to impose lifetime
disenfranchisement on rehabilitated firsttimers who were convicted of multiple
counts in one trial, such unequal distribution of the right to vote would fail to
satisfy the requisite strict scrutiny test.
This test requires a compelling state interest for such discrimination and also requires the least restrictive impact on the
right to vote.
"No right is more precious in a free
country than that of having a voice in the
election of those who make the laws
under which, as good Citizens, we must
live. Other rights, even the most basic are
illusory if the right to vote is underminded."111 It is "a fundamental political
right, because [it is] preservative of all
rights."1J2 "[S]tatutes distributing the franchise constitute the foundation of our
representative SOCiety. Any unjustified
discrimination in determining who may
participate ... in the selection of public
officials undermines the legitimacy of
representative government."1J3 "The right
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to vote freely for the candidate of one's
choice is of the essence of a democratic
society, and any restrictions on that right
strike at the heart of representative government."114 "To the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that
much less a citizen."115
Because the right to vote is a fundamental constitutional privilege, any curtailment or denial of that privilege must
satisfy the Supreme Court's test of strict
judicial scrutiny, requiring the State to
demonstrate a compelling governmental
interest for such a denial. 1I6 The Court
has stated that, under the compelling
state interest test, "a heavy burden of justification is on the State."117 Even the
showing of "a very substantial state interest" is insufficient. 1I8 Moreover, "the deference ususally given to the judgment of
legislators does not extend to decisions
concerning which resident citizens may
participate in the election of legislators
and other public officials .... Accordingly, when we are reviewing statutes
which deny some residents the right to
vote, the general presumption of constitutionality afforded state statutes [is] not
applicable. "119
Not only must denial be compellingly
justified, but the justification must be
served through the least restrictive of all
possible alternatives. In Dunn v. Blumstein, the Supreme Court stated:
Statutes affecting constitutional
rights must be drawn with "precision," and must be "tailored" to serve
their legitimate objectives. And if
there are other, reasonable ways to
achieve those goals with a lesser
burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose
the way of greater interference. If it
acts at all, it must choose "less drastic means."120
Maryland has likewise recognized that
the "right of citizens to vote is a fundamental right in our society and one which
is zealously guarded by the courts. "121 In
Broadwater v. State,122 while holding
that the right to seek elective office is not
a fundamental right, the court of appeals
recognized that the strict scrutiny test
applies to the right to vote.
With the foregoing framework for
analysis, the question becomes how, if at
all, does Richardson v. Ramlrezl23 affect
the application of this constitutional
doctrine in the Broadwater case.
Richardson addressed the relationship
between section one of the fourteenth
amendment, the equal protection clause,

"in dealing with voting rights as it does,"124
and section two, prohibiting the denial of
the right to vote to 21-year-old males, "except for participation in rebellion, or
other crime. "125 The Court interpreted
section two to permit a state to totally
disenfranchise, as a group, all convicted
felons. The controlling issue in both the
California Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court was the authority
of a state to disenfranchise this group of
potential voters, as a groUp.126 "Although
the plaintiffs in Richardson could have
challenged the disparity between the
means of reenfranchisement available to
convicted felons ... , they did not do
SO."127

Broadwater argued that Richardson
did not address disenfranchisement of
some, but not all, within the "section
two" group. If some, but not all, are
disenfranchised, the equal protection
clause of section one controls. The Court
in Richardson recognized this when, notwithstanding its sanction of total disenfranchisement, it remanded the case to
address whether there was disparate treatment of convicted felons in different
counties and, if so, whether such dis parityviolated the equal'protection clause. 128
Broadwater argued that the Maryland
legislature could have elected to disenfranchise all convicted felons. However,
when in 1974 it enacted legislation to
provide the right to vote to rehabilitated
first-timers, it was constitutionally required to provide that right equally to all
such people. "[I]f a challenged statute
grants the right to vote to some citizens
and denies the franchise to others, 'the
Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest."'129 As Justice Powell stated: "The right of all persons to
vote, once the State has decided to make
it available to some, becomes a basic
one under the Constitution. "130 The legislature must distribute and restore the
right to vote equally because of the
"requir[ ement of] uniform treatment of
persons standing in the same relation
"131

The State countered by arguing that
Broadwater did "not cite a single case
which holds that a state's disenfranchisement of some or all convicted felons is
subject to strict scrutiny."B2 The State
continued:
Richardson and its predecessors
clearly control this case. Indeed, as
the circuit court below correctly recognized, in Thiess v. State Administrative Board ofElection Laws, 387
F. Supp. 1038 (D. Md. 1974), a

three-judge panel rejected an equal
protection assault on the very statute assailed here: "State statutes
disenfranchising those ofits citizens
who are convicted of 'infamous
crimes' unless pardoned do not
contravene the Equal Protection
Clause. Thiess, 387 F. Supp. at 1041.
In [f]act, the Thiess court tells us
that Richardson v. Ramirez represents the final word upon the Equal
Protection Claim."m
Broadwater's third equal protection
argument was that, even if the right to
vote were not a fundamental constitutional right, if article 33, section 3-4(c),
were to restore the right to vote to rehabilitated first-timers who were convicted
of one count in one trial, but to impose
lifetime disenfranchisement on rehabilitated first-timers who were convicted of
multiple counts in one trial, such unequal distribution of the right to vote
would fail to satisfy even the rational
basis test. He argued that, notwithstanding the historical ease of satisfying the rational basis test, the Supreme Court,
consistent with the expanding notion of
equal protection, has recently held statutes to be violative of the equal protection clause because they were not supported by a rational basis.IH
Conclusion
It appeared all along that the Broadwater case would almost certainly be resolved on statutory construction grounds.
The statutory construction issue presented numerous relevant and overlapping principles of interpretation. Although there was authOrity to support
both Sides, the analysis supporting Broadwater's position was stronger and the
court of appeals was correct to adopt it.
The equal protection issue presented
a conflict between the fundamental right
to vote and the power of the State to
disenfranchise convicted felons. The authority on the State's side was quite strong.
Because Broadwater prevailed under the
court's resolution of the statutory construction issue, the court was correct to
avoid the constitutional question.
The six-year saga of former Senator
Broadwater in the federal and state courts
has come to an end. As a result of the
reinstatement of Broadwater's right to
vote by the court of appeals, he becomes
eligible to seek public office, and Broadwater has announced that he plans to do
so. Consequently, Broadwater now leaves
the judicial arena and reenters the political arena.
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choose, secured by the Constitution,' is a
civil right of the highest order."); accord
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 u.s. 641,
654 (1966) ("precious and fundemental").
116Kramer, 395 u.s. at 627-28 ("whether
the exclusions are necessary to promote
a compelling state interest .... The need
for exacting judicial scrutiny"); Evans v.
Corman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970) ("purpose of the restriction and the assertedly
overriding interests served by it must
meet close constitutional scrutiny"); Reynolds, 377 u.s. at 562 ("infringement of
the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized");
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,
383 U.S. 663, 383 u.s. at 670 ("classifications which might invade or restrain [the
right to vote] must be closely scrutinized
and carefully confined"); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 u.s. 330, 360 (1972) ("exacting standard of preCision"); Rosario v.

Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 768, rehearingdenied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973) (powell,
]., dissenting) ("withstand the strict judicial scrutiny called for").
117Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343 .
118Id.
119Kramer, 395 u.s. at 627-28 (emphasis
added).
12°Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343 (citations omitted).
121
56 Md. Op.Att'yGen. 189, 190 (1971);
see also State v. Key, 128 Ariz. 419, 626
P.2d 149, 151 (1981) (restoration of the
right to vote construed favorably to the
defendant, but not the right to expungement, because there is a fundamental
right to vote but not to have one's criminal record expunged).
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122306 Md. 597, 510A.2d 583 (1986).
m418 U.S. 24 (1974).
124Id. at 55.
I25U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2.
126See Allen v. Ellisor, 664 F.2d 391, 394
(4th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Shepherd v.
Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1112 (5th Cir.
1978).
12
575 F.2d at 1112-13.
8
12 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 56; see, e.g.,
Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 26-27 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 963 (1983);
Williams v. Taylor, 677 F.2d 510, 515
(5th Cir. 1982); Shepherd, 575 F.2d at
1114; Allen, 664 F.2d at 400 (Murnaghan,
J., concurring) ("implied equal
protection"); see also Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985). "The State's
interest in perserving the 'purity' of the
franchise may allow it to exclude all felons,
cf. Richardson v. Ramirez, but exclusion
of some, but not all, of the subject category of persons (here, misdemeanants)
must be supported by a compelling state
interest." Hobson v. Pow, 434 F. Supp.
362, 366 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (emphasis
added); Tate v. Collins, 496 F. Supp. 205,
207 (W.D. Tenn. 1980); see also Collier
v. Menzel, 176 Cal. App. 3d 24,221 Cal.
Rptr. 110, 113-14 (1985).
129Dunn, 405 U.S. at 337 (quoting Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627) (emphasis in Dunn).
130Rosario, 410 U.S. at 764 (dissenting
opinion) (emphasis added); accord
Harper, 383 U.S. at 665, 670 (once
granted, the franchise must be distributed equally); 56 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 189,
191 (1971).
BlReynolds, 377 U.S. at 565; accord
Williams v. Taylor, 677 F.2d 510, 516
("between Similarly situated individuals");
Allen v. Ellisor, 664 F.2d 391,405 (Hall,
]., dissenting) ("among persons of equal
culpability") .
I32Reply Brief ofAppellants-Cross-Appellees at 16.
mId. at 19.
IHSee generally City of Cleburne v. cleburneLivingCenter, 473 U.S. 432 (1985);
Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor,
472 U.S. 612 (1985); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985); Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. W.G. Ward,]r., 470
U.S. 869, rehearing denied, 471 U.S.
1120 (1985); see, e.g., O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974) (invalidated
statute that permitted incarcerated pretrial detainees and misdemeanants to vote
by absentee ballot, if incarcerated in a
county other than their residence, but
denied the same to persons Similarly incarcerated within the county of their
residence); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S.
134 (1972) (statute violated equal pro-

tection by requiring a candidate filing fee
and providing no alternative for
indigents); Hobson v. Pow, 434 F. Supp.
362 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (no rational basis in
the selection of disqualifying crimes);
Butts v. Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573 (S.D.
Iowa 1974) (no rational relationship between excluding convicted felons from
civil service employment and the legitimate purpose of protection of the public
trust); see also Wheeler v. State, 281 Md.
593, 380 A.2d 1052, cert. denied, 435
U.S. 997 (1977).
Broadwater also argued that the prosecutor determines which counts to charge
and which counts to press to the jury. As
the Supreme Court of Louisiana stated,
when interpreting the language "for the
first conviction only," "whether a defendant faces more than a single count in his
first prosecution ... may depend entirely
on fortuitous circumstances or the prosecutor's discretion." State v. Wimberly,
414 So.2d 666, 674 (1982). Cj Trap v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,118-19 (1956) (expatriation resulted as much from prosecutorial discretion within military trials as
any other factor).
Broadwater further argued that the reenfranchisement statute, if so interpreted,
is fatally flawed because of its overinclusiveness and its failure to tailor to the
least restrictive alternative. In Butts v.
Nichols, 381 F. Supp. 573 (S.D. Iowa
1974), the court invalidated a statute that
prohibited civil service employment of
convicted felons. Finding the statute
overinclusive, the court stated: "[N]o
consideration is given to the nature and
seriousness ofthe crime." Id. at 581. The
court in Butts also found that "the time
elapsing since the conviction [and] the
degree of the felon's rehabilitation ... are
similarly ignored." Id. Finally, the overinclusiveness analysis of Butts addressed
the law's failure to consider "the circumstances under which the crime was committed ... " Id.; see also Bullock v. Carter,
405 U.S. 134, 146 (1972) (statute "extraordinarily ill-fitted to [its] goal; other
means to protect those valid interests are
available") .
Broadwater also argued that the voting
restoration statute, if so interpreted, is fatally flawed because it contains an unconstitutional irrebutable presumption. The
State's interpretation classifies together,
and disenfranchises for life, both recidivists and rehabilitated first-timers convicted of multiple counts in one trial. The
recidivists, prior to becoming recidiviSts,
had the opportunity to restore their right
to vote by becoming rehabilitated, i.e., by
never again being convicted of a disquali-

fying crime, assuming only one count in
the first trial. By contrast, rehabilitated
first-timers, who were convicted of more
than one count in one trial, are irrebutably presumed not capable of rehabilitation. They will never be permitted even
one chance at rehabilitation because they
received their second conviction along
with their first conviction. The statute
declares that, as a matter oflaw, all firsttimers convicted of one count in one
trial, who do not become recidivists, are
rehabilitated, and thus their right to vote
is automatically restored upon completion of their sanction. On the other hand,
the statute declares that, as a matter of
law, all first-timers convicted of multiple
counts in one trial, even if they never
become recidivists, are, and for the rest of
their lives remain, unrehabilitated and
incapable of becoming rehabilitated, and
thus their right to vote is automatically
denied for life. In Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.s. 89 (1965), the Supreme Court
stated: "'[T]he presumption here created is .. . definitely conclusive L incapable of being overcome by proof of the
most positive character.' ... Not one of
them can evervote .... " Id. at 96 (citation
omitted). In Rosario, the Court analyzed
the common thread among six of its prior
rulings, each holding unconstitutional a
voting statute. "In each of those cases, the
State totally denied the electoral franchise to a particular class of residents,
and there was no way in which the
members of that class could have made
themselves eligible to vote." 410 U.S. at
757; see also Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S.
814,818 (1969) (striking down a "rigid,
arbitrary formula").
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